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August 19, 2001
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Assessment of the Risks Inherent to the Weapons
Collection Plan for Macedonia
Otfried
Nassauer
NATO will only collect and dispose of weapons which
are handed in deliberately. It will neither conduct searches for
weapons nor forcefully disarm persons holding weapons in situations
other than being attacked or threatened by attack. It will collect
weapons from the UCK but not from other armed Albanian militias.
There are several risks inherent to the weapons
collection process:
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Firstly, concerning how much needs to be
collected. Initial NLA estimates made available to NATO’s special
representative Pieter Feith refer to 2.300 weapons to be handed
in. Final numbers, types of weapon and other details still need
to be determined. In contrast, the Macedonian government claims
there to be 8.000 UCK-fighters and other armed Albanians, insinuating
that a minimum of 8.000 weapons need to be collected. Somewhat
under pressure from Western governments the Ministry of Defense
specified that it accounted for 2.000 UCK rebels and 6.000 other
armed personnel. Conversely, the Ministry of the Interior referred
to 6.000 UCK rebels plus 2.000 other armed personnel. Western
intelligence sources have accounted for 3.500-4.500 UCK rebels
during recent weeks. A more realistic estimate for what needs
to be collected in order to effectively disarm the UCK is between
7.000 and 12.000 weapons - given that rebel armies seldom arm
their soldiers with less than one weapon and in most cases with
two to three. This remains true even if NATO’s commanding General
Lange is correct in assuming that total disarmament is an unrealistic
goal.
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Second, is the issue of what needs to be
collected. Certainly assault and sniper rifles, submachine-guns,
machine-guns, anti-tank weapons, mortars, artillery pieces,
landmines, rockets and grenade launchers plus ammunition. Also
likely is the collection of a limited number of air defense
weapons and possibly a few armored vehicles. It would also be
prudent to collect night vision equipment and other advanced
military gear. However, it is unlikely that pistols and hunting
rifles will be collected, as they are part of the local weapons
culture.
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Third, is the question of where the weapons
will be collected. NATO will set up rotational collection points
in five geographic areas which will each open three times. In
addition it will be possible to hand in weapons to KFOR patrols
along the Kosovo-Macedonian border. This latter arrangement
raises the question of how seriously to take denials that the
Kosovo-Albanian UCK or the KPC support(ed) the Macedonian-Albanian
UCK.
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Fourth, is the issue of who is going to be
disarmed. NATO’s commander, General Lange, claims that only
the UCK and not other armed groups of Albanians, will be disarmed.
At least one such group exists, the Albanian National Army ANA
or AKSh, which wants to continue the fight for a Greater Albania.
At the time of writing it is still unclear as to how strong
the ANA is militarily. The rebel group has two options: It can
decide to continue fighting while NATO disarms the UCK and thus
endanger the peace process (with the possibility of attacks
on NATO) or it can wait until NATO’s Task Force Harvest (TFH)
has left the country and then again take up the fight against
the Macedonian government forces.
Thus what are the options for UCK-fighters? In
principle fighters and/or UCK-units can opt
a) to withdraw to Kosovo, handing in their weapons at
the border or even hoping to avoid disarmament, cf. the situation
with the UCPMB in Southern Serbia;
b) declaring itself part of the ANA/AKSh or future additional
groups, which have not agreed to the disarmament and intend
to continue fighting,
c) to hide their weapons for an unknown future
d) or disarm according to the agreement.
While the political leadership of the Macedonian
UCK has agreed to disarm and currently seems to be serious about
this commitment, it remains unclear what individual fighters, commanders
and units will do. ANA has asked them to join its ranks. It remains
to be seen what percentage of fighters will pursue each path. Finally,
it also remains unclear as to whether the ANA leadership has personal
links to the UCK-leadership or any parts of it. ANA’s attack on
a Macedonian military convoy driving from Skopje to Tetovo was said
to be conducted in cooperation with UCK-units. The latter aspect
is of great importance, since the UCK has a strong organisational
hierarchy yet at times pretends to have vertical structures of authority
and thus argues it can not issue strict orders to all of its fighters.
In addition, there is the major problem of the
security of ethnic Macedonians in areas that are controlled by the
UCK during the process. Macedonia’s Slavic citizens may feel exposed
to a risk of ethnic cleansing as the Macedonian security forces
are required to withdraw to their barracks during phase one of the
operation, while NATO forces are still in the process of deployment.
Their situation might improve somewhat thereafter with Task Force
Harvest (TFH) showing up and requiring the UCK to hand in weapons.
However, such improvement would only occur if the Rules of Engagement
for TFH include the use of force in protection of Macedonian civilians.
From our perspective, this is unlikely to happen.
The risks described in this brief analysis lead
us to the following conclusions:
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It is far from clear that TFH will be able
to conduct its mission within 30-45 days as envisaged. A prolonged
deployment is likely.
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The operation as currently planned can lead
to two possible situations:
a) partial disarmament, which bears the potential risk of
future escalation, or
b) the need to upgrade the TFH mandate. This would involve
expanding the body’s tasks, strengthening the rules of engagement
as well as increasing the number of troops. These improvements
to the TFH’s role should be made as soon as possible to avoid
a loss of TFH’s credibility; ideally prior to the deployment
of NATO’s full contingent
- As a general requirement, TFH should carefully avoid any impression
of positioning itself between Macedonian and Albanian controlled
territories.
BITS
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