Options for Change
NATO, Russia, Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Disarmament
Otfried Nassauer
I. Introduction
During the Washington Summit in April 1999
NATO committed itself to review the Alliances arms control, non-proliferation and
disarmament policies. While public interest in this review concentrates on the nuclear
field, the process itself does not. By December 2000 NATO Foreign Ministers are expected
to discuss an initial report on future options.
The scope of the review undertaken by the Alliance has been and still
is somewhat controversial. While some Alliance members prefer a more limited approach,
others would like to see this process become a full scale review of the Alliances
nuclear policy and posture. However, any review of substance will eventually lead towards
renewed efforts to discuss the Alliances (nuclear) strategy and posture. Even more,
there is a need for such a discussion as the Alliances 1998/99 strategy review on
the one hand felt victim to the Kosovo war and thus did not produce much of the necessary
debate. On the other hand, it produced a debate whether the role of NATOs nuclear
arsenal should be widened to cope with all WMD threats.
NATOs members are facing an important choice. On the one hand
they can help to make progress possible towards future steps of nuclear disarmament and
thus help to safe-guard and strengthen the existing non-proliferation regimes. On the
other hand they can fail to do so and thus strengthen trends to give nuclear weapons a
wider role for the future and eventually give priority to fighting the results of
proliferation by military means over preventing proliferation to occur.
This paper concentrates on some options for NATO and its member states
to strengthen the Alliances contribution to the future of nuclear arms control and
to safe-guard the non-proliferation regimes. In addition, in some aspects it looks beyond
the nuclear issue.
II. NATOs Nuclear Arms Control Options
NATO is neither a nuclear power nor a state party to existing
arms-control agreements or involved in any negotiations that might lead to future
arms-control treaties. The Alliances room to manoeuvre is thus limited on the one
hand and dependent on nuclear member states actions on the other hand. However,
three of the declared nuclear weapon states are members of NATO, two are involved in
formulating the Alliances nuclear policy and thus there is no other multilateral
institution which could hypothetically influence the future of nuclear arms-control to the
same degree as NATO could. NATO is also unique in binding together several nuclear and
several non-nuclear weapon states within one alliance. This gives NATOs
deliberations on the future of nuclear arms-control a very specific role.
In its current review the Alliance should concentrate on a limited
number of changes that, however, could make a real difference. This paper makes five
specific suggestions:
NATO should strengthen its commitment to include sub-strategic
nuclear weapons into arms-control regimes. The Alliance should commit itself to support
negotiations and the conclusion of a START-III treaty, equivalent to a Comprehensive
(nuclear) Arms-Reduction Treaty (CART) at the earliest date possible. Such a treaty should
build on the results of the 1997 Helsinki Summit 1 and set a single upper limit
for all nuclear warheads allowed for the future. "All" should indeed mean
"all" and thus encompass strategic as well as non-strategic warheads, regardless
whether they are active, hedge or reserve. Both, Russia and the United States should have
a "freedom to mix" their remaining warheads from different categories, when
accounting against this single upper limit2. The limit itself could be set
anywhere between 1.500 2.500 warheads.
The Alliance should not exclude the option of conducting unilateral
initiatives in support of reaching such a bilateral agreement. It should adopt a number of
confidence and security building measures and initiatives which might ease the achievement
of the goal described in the first suggestion. Among the steps that might prove helpful
are:
a)a major initiative to increase transparency on sub-strategic nuclear weapons, their
deployment and nuclear doctrine, possibly conducted under the auspices of the PJC;
b) an offer to Russia indicating that sub-strategic nuclear weapon deployments in Europe
might no longer be necessary once this category of nuclear weapons becomes subject to
nuclear arms control;
c) an indication to the Russian Federation that the same is true for sea-based
sub-strategic nuclear weapons currently deployed in the US but retained in active status;
d) some strengthened NATO commitment to permanently ban the deployment of sub-strategic
nuclear weapons on the territories of all new members to NATO;
e) Finally, NATO should approach Russia over her reluctance to discuss sub-strategic
weapons which in part could result from Russian fears not to possess all details necessary
for a data-exchange likely to be part of any treaty that includes these weapons. An offer
allowing for consecutive but narrowing error margins throughout a sequence of data
exchanges could meet this concern, if it indeed exists3.
NATO should consider to reintroduce the Alliances 1990 London
language perceiving nuclear weapons as "weapons of last resort". To make the
meaning of this term perfectly clear, it should be defined as "an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a (member) State would be at
stake"4. This language is modelled after the single case of nuclear use or
threat, which was not declared illegal by the Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice in 1996. In addition, the Alliance might consider issuing a Negative Security
Assurance of its own to non-nuclear states. It is crucial that the Alliance makes clear
that there is no role for nuclear weapons in the Alliances nuclear doctrine to
threaten the use or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
NATO should consider to announce a review of the Alliances 1992
Glenneagles "Political Principles for Nuclear Planning and Consultations" to the
effect of reducing the military and strengthening the political role of nuclear weapons in
the Alliance strategy;
Finally, the Alliance members should initiate a substantial program
to assist Russia in dismantling her arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. This might
include financial as well as technical assistance. However, all precautions should been
taken so that this program does not become subject to the same type of Russian suspicions
that the US Co-operative Threat Reduction program became subject to. This may require that
the program be handled and supervised not by NATO as a whole, but by one or several
non-nuclear NATO nations.
In addition, NATO should clearly declare its support for the 2000
NPT-Review Conferences program of strengthening nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation. It should explore options for co-operation with Russia in strengthening
existing non-proliferation regimes and thus reduce the demand for both wide area theatre
ballistic missile defences as well as national missile defences.
III. NATOs Non-Nuclear Weapon States
There is one specific option some of NATOs non-nuclear
weapon states might consider as a contribution of their own to support the above mentioned
proposals.
Those countries that have the technical capability to employ US
sub-strategic nuclear weapons under NATOs nuclear sharing arrangements should
consider to individually or collectively declare their preparedness to give up this
capability. This would support a US-Russian agreement on tactical nuclear weapons and
would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Such a step would have a wide range of advantages in a number of
different contexts. Among them are
In the future, all non-nuclear NATO members would contribute in the
same way to NATOs nuclear strategy. NATOs internal debate over different
classes of membership and different levels of security would finally come to an end once
all members would agree to accept the same level of involvement in Alliance nuclear
affairs that NATOs new members had to agree to when accepted to NATO.
The reasoning behind the deployment of sub-strategic nuclear weapons
in European non-nuclear weapon states thus would be much reduced; support from influential
quarters in the US military and defence establishment can be expected, but opposition is
likely to come from civilian defence officials and the Department of State.
The initiative would function as a substantial confidence building
measure towards Russia.
It would eliminate the origins of all claims and suspicions that
NATOs nuclear sharing violates the spirit or the letter of the NPT and thus
strengthen the Alliances overall commitment to the non-proliferation regime.
Finally, such a step might help to create a common understanding
among all non-nuclear weapon states in NATO on the future role of nuclear weapons in the
Alliance strategy and thus ease a review of the Alliances nuclear strategy as well
as the consultation and decision-making process on nuclear weapons.
IV. Looking at Russia
Most Western analysts agree that Russia
does not show any serious interest in reducing or eliminating tactical nuclear weapons.
They present the following reasoning:
Russia has widened the role of nuclear weapons in the countries
military doctrine and perceives tactical nuclear weapons as a means to counter her
opponents conventional superiority as well as a regional deterrent;
Russia cannot maintain the number of strategic nuclear weapons she is
allowed to keep; a high number of number of non-strategic weapons is perceived as some
counterweight;
Russia does not want to enter another costly disarmament agreement.
There are much higher ranking priorities for government spending.
This author believes that Russia must have a serious interest in
tactical nuclear reductions. Russia is not able to maintain her non-strategic nuclear
arsenal. It is deteriorating quickly; there are no resources at hand to either keep it
operational or modernise it. There is no reason to believe that the situation will improve
any time soon. However, the Russian military and MINATOM do not yet see any good reason to
publicly admit Russias weakness in respect to the countrys non-strategic
nuclear posture and thus prefer to signal disinterest.
Some of these concerns can be met and incentives can be developed to
ease the reluctance on the Russian end. Offering the elimination of the US European based
nuclear weapons eliminates them from the Russian strategic equation. The same is true for
SLCMs which are still considered an additional tool in NATOs nuclear posture in
times of crisis and war. Both steps would reflect a long-standing Russian interest. A
freedom to mix strategic and non-strategic systems when accounting for warheads against a
future START-III/CART upper limit increases Moscows capability to economically and
technically cope with a higher total number of warheads allowed and when thinking about
the overall nuclear balance. It also allows for a quicker retirement of Russian nuclear
systems that otherwise need costly maintenance or even upgrades. It provides Russia with
an option to compensate with non-strategic systems for strategic systems which she can no
longer maintain. Finally, an offer to assist Russia with the dismantling of her tactical
nuclear weapons could meet Moscows concerns about the countries financial
constraints and priorities5.
This leaves Russia beyond the nuclear theatre - with two
major questions when it comes to the countries overall perception of strategic
stability: The conventional balance and new concerns resulting from missile defences.
V. Beyond Nuclear Arms Control
Superior Western conventional forces and NATO enlargement have caused
Russian concerns about the overall strategic stability in the European region. Russia
began to mirror NATOs cold war doctrine of flexible response, which compensated
numerical conventional inferiority by reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and a first use
doctrine. In order to change the Russian perception, the basics of the CFE-process must be
reassessed.
CFE is in a crisis. No single signatory has ratified CFE-2 since it was
signed almost a year ago. The guiding principle for CFE-2 became "flexibility"
for reinforcements as opposed to stability (i.e. avoiding sudden force concentrations
capable to attack) in CFE-1. In addition, CFE-2 does not truly reflect the changes to the
European political geography that came about with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and
the Soviet Union. The Russian South is Moscows greatest concern since the
limitations of CFE flank agreements forced Russia to agree to a flexibility oriented
approach while national interest would have dictated a stability oriented approach.
NATO could make a substantial contribution to the future of European
security by rethinking the basics of CFE. The Alliance has been deeply involved in framing
the existing agreements. It is in a very advantageous position and should be able to
rethink both the numeric limitations imposed and the geographic outline underlying the
treaty. A commitment to consult with Russia for the ideas for changes necessary could
prove helpful and represent a confidence building measure..
The other non-conventional issue of concern to Russia is NMD. Here
again, the Alliance has no direct, but an indirect say. NATO is not a party to the ABM
treaty. However, it has become very clear that Russia fears that strategic stability (i.e.
deterrence based on the capability for mutual destruction and the combination of rough
parity and mutual vulnerability) is coming under severe pressure from the combination of
developing US missile defence capabilities and increasing first-strike capabilities
resulting from the modernisation of the US Trident fleet.
While NATO does not have a say over the national US decision on whether
and when to deploy missile defences, the Alliance could
undertake an in depth analysis of the consequences of missile
defences for strategic stability, the future of bilateral and multilateral arms control as
well as for the future of the existing non-proliferation regimes;
seriously consider the consequences of indicating a (gradual) shift
in priorities from prohibiting proliferation towards militarily fighting its consequences;
and
explore the option for joint initiatives with Russia to effectively
strengthen the non-proliferation regimes and allow for the postponement of the decision in
principle on whether to give up the ABM treaty or not.
VI. The Next Presidency Aspect
NATOs arms control and non-proliferation review will not be
finalised until a new American administration comes in. Indeed, the next US President will
have already been elected when NATO discusses the interim report. A new presidency might
mean changes to the US policy in NATO. Many arms-control minded analysts and scholars
express deep concerns over the possibility of an incoming Republican administration and
the consequences that might result for the future of nuclear arms control,
non-proliferation politics and the future of multilateral arms control negotiations.
The author of this paper shares these concerns as far as the future of
multilateral arms control is concerned. Multilateral arms-control is likely to suffer from
a Republican administration. However, he does not fully share the concerns in respect to
the general future of nuclear disarmament.
A Bush Administration might be prepared to begin unilateral
(reciprocal) steps in nuclear disarmament, cutting much deeper into current nuclear
arsenals than might be expected of a Gore administration. Even more important, a Bush
Administration might be able to mount the necessary congressional support to allow for the
necessary change in US policy, while a Democratic administration might be hampered by the
same blockades erected during the Clinton administration;
One should not take it for granted that a Bush Administration would
hurry into NMD deployment and immediately scrap the ABM Treaty. It might well choose
instead to increase research and development funding for those elements of a national
missile defence that received only limited funding during the Clinton years, namely
technologies for space based elements, naval missile defence and for boost-phase intercept
technologies.
If so, those interested in the future of arms control and
non-proliferation would need a strategy on how to deal with the new situation. Three
initial steps can be named that might prove helpful:
Osgoods GRID-concept of gradual unilateral reciprocal
disarmament and its derivatives should be revisited when developing options for dealing
constructively with unilateral initiatives possibly taken by a Republican administration;
Research into developing intelligent options and increased pressure
for binding a Republican administrations unilateral steps of arms-control into
strategies that support multilateralism should be conducted. A clear-cut NATO statement in
support of the results of the recent NPT Review Conference might prove a useful initial
tool having this effect; and
Research also needs to be done on the thinking as well as policy
record that future core members of a Bush Administrations defence and foreign policy
team had during their years in government under the previous Bush Administration.
Otfried Nassauer is
Director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITS)
Refereneces
1 The Summit committed
both sides to prepare for a START-III treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons to
2.000-2.500 for both Russia and the US. It was also agreed to discuss tactical nuclear
weapons as well as verified warhead dismantlement
2 For a more detailed description of this
proposal and the incentives involved for both sides, see: Oliver Meier and Otfried
Nassauer: Next START by CART: Breaking the disarmament deadlock, BITS Policy Note 97.1,
Berlin, March 1997 based on a presentation delivered at a December 1996 Pugwash workshop
in London and for a very similar idea Ashton Carter and John Deutch: No nukes, Not yet,
Wall Street Journal March 4, 1997)
Beyond the arguments developed in the referenced
sources, the suggested treaty would ease the inclusion of arrangements for verified
warhead dismantling as well as preparing for the future inclusion of smaller nuclear
powers into this bilateral treaty: Verification of dismantling would be eased since this
approach allows for a non-intrusive verification system modelled after the
"warhead-container in pit container out" logic and thus reduce the need
to develop various verification options allowing to distinguish between all different
types of warheads. The future inclusion of lesser nuclear weapon states would be
important, since the British nuclear posture, consisting of sub-strategic and strategic
Trident systems only could be coped with much easier.
3 It is not clear whether Russia
seriously does have such a concern. However, given the withdrawal of thousands of weapons
removed at high speed from CEE as well as the CIS republics from 1990 onward, there
realistically might be such a concern resulting from discrepancies or gaps in the records
of those days. One indication for the problems Russia had in that period became visible
when Russia continued to store nuclear weapons in Eastern Germany even after
reunification.
4 The Advisory Opinion
of the International Court Of Justice is reprinted in: IALANA (ed.) "Atomwaffen vor
dem Internationalen Gerichtshof", Lit-Verlag, Münster, 1997, pp.69-111. The quote
can be found on p.104
5 The financial
constraints have to be taken seriously. The Russian Federations proposed 2001 total
budget ($ 40 bn) is smaller than the inner-German transfer from the old laender into the
new laender (more than $ 45bn), less than one fifth of the German budget and less than one
seventh of the US defence budget. For nine years Russia had to live from its substance,
while not investing in the countries infrastructure. For the years to come,
infrastructure investments, such as into gas and oil pipelines, lines of communications
etc will require every single ruble available.